Research

PLUS Economic research seminar

The Department of Econonomics of the Paris Lodron University of Salzburg (PLUS) invites researchers to present and discuss their latest research in economics and management.

Research seminar

Our research seminar is Tuesdays from 17:00–18:30. On-site talks take place in room HS 302 (FRA1OG4.420). Online talks take place on Zoom. If you want to attend the seminar, please contact Lisa Windsteiger.

29.10.2024
(on-site)
Title: Heteroskedastic Structural VARs Identified via Long-run Restrictions
Speaker: Martin Bruns (University of East Anglia)


Abstract: A central assumption for identifying structural shocks in VAR models via heteroskedasticity is the time-invariance of the impact effects of the shocks. It is shown how that assumption can be tested when long-run restrictions are used for identifying one or more structural shocks. The importance of performing such tests is illustrated by investigating the impact of fundamental shocks on stock prices.
5.11.2024
(on-site)
Title: The effect of a ‘None of the above’ ballot paper option on voting behavior and election outcomes
Speaker: Ben Greiner (WU Wien)


Abstract: We study how an explicit blank vote option “None of the above” (NOTA) on the ballot paper affects the behavior of voters and political candidates as well as election results. In a series of survey and laboratory experiments we identify a tradeoff regarding making NOTA an explicit voting option. On the one hand it can reduce the vote share of candidates who voters consider as protest candidates, who often come from the extremes of the political spectrum, making it less likely that such a protest candidate wins the election. On theother hand, anticipating the above effect, establishment candidates may care less about the electorate when NOTA is on the ballot. Evidence on voters’ reaction to NOTA comes from two online survey experiments conducted in the weeks preceding the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election and the 2016 Austrian run-off election for President. Participants were subjected to either the original ballot paper or to a ballot paper where we added a NOTA option. We investigate the dynamic response of politicians to the presence of NOTA in a laboratory experiment in which an establishment candidate can decide between selfish and fair policy proposals and voters can choose between the establishment candidate and an inefficient protest option.
12.11.2024
(on-site)
Title: Lifting the Veil of Ignorance – Survey Experiments on Preferences for Wealth Redistribution
Speaker: Silke Übelmesser (Universität Jena)

Abstract: We conduct a large-scale online survey in Germany to study beliefs about wealth inequality and preferences for wealth redistribution. First, we examine participants’ knowledge of the German wealth distribution and their position in it. Second, we examine the impact of two information experiments on redistribution preferences. One group receives information about the shape of the wealth distribution, while the other group learns their position in the distribution. We find no significant average treatment effects in the full sample. However, those who overestimate their position reduce their opposition to inequality after learning their position, while those who underestimate their position are more likely to believe that anyone can become successful through hard work. We employ a data-driven approach to systematically investigate heterogeneity in treatment effects and present evidence that younger participants decrease their support for redistribution after learning the shape of the wealth distribution, while older participants decrease their support after learning their position in the distribution.
26.11.2024
(on-site)
Title: Simple macroeconomic forecast distributions for the G7 economies
Speaker: Fabian Krüger (KIT)

Abstract: We present a simple method for predicting the distribution of output growth and inflation in the G7 economies. The method is based on point forecasts published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as robust statistics from the empirical distribution of the IMF’s past forecast errors while imposing coherence of prediction intervals across horizons. We show that the technique yields calibrated prediction intervals and performs similar to, or better than, more complex time series models in terms of statistical loss functions. We provide a simple website with graphical illustrations of our forecasts, as well as time-stamped data files that document their real time character.
10.12.2024
(on-site)
Title: Uncovering Disaggregated Oil Market Dynamics: A Full-Information Approach to Granular Instrumental Variables
Speaker: Christiane Baumeister (University of Notre Dame)

Abstract: The world price of oil is determined by the interactions of multiple producers and consumers who face different constraints and shocks. We show how this feature of the oil market can be used to estimate local and global elasticities of supply and demand and provide a rich set of testable restrictions. We develop a novel approach to estimation based on full-information maximum likelihood that generalizes the insights from granular instrumental variables. We conclude that the supply responses of Saudi Arabia and adjustments of inventories have historically played a key role in stabilizing the price of oil. We illustrate how our structural model can be used to analyze how individual producers and consumers would dynamically adapt to a geopolitical event such as a major disruption in the supply of oil from Russia.
14.1.2025
(on-site)
Title: Trade Dispute Settlement, Enforcement and the WTO
Speaker: Christoph Moser (FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg)

Abstract: The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is frequently called the “crown jewel” of the multilateral trading system. Yet, little is known about its enforcement strength. We offer a new empirical approach by systematically linking the stock prices of directly affected firms to all WTO dispute settlement cases with a final ruling from 1995 to July 2023. We argue that these stock prices react to important news about WTO rulings, if and only if, investors expect these rulings to be enforced. In this case, we expect stock prices of firms aligned with the complaining – and for the vast majority of cases winning – government to react positively relative to firms linked to the respondent government. We indeed find a statistically significant, economically relevant and robust differential effect in abnormal returns between these two firm types. This is clear evidence for the existence of self-enforcement through the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism, but recent attacks on the WTO have considerably undermined this enforcement strength.
21.1.2025
(on-site)
Title: TBA
Speaker: Martin Feldkircher (DA Wien)


Abstract: TBA
28.1.2025
(on-site)
Title: TBA
Speaker: Josef Zweimüller (Universität Zurich)


Abstract: TBA

Previous research seminars: Summer 2024, Winter 2023, Summer 2023, Winter 2022, Summer 2022, Winter 2021

Picture: ©  flickr.com/uni-salzburg